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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1961, when Justice Clark wrote the opinion in Mapp v. Ohio,
I
the revolution in criminal procedure was on. Vigorously for the next
ten years, 2 and moderately for another ten,3 the United States Su-
preme Court utilized various provisions of the first eight amendments
to the United States Constitution to formulate a constitutional code of
criminal procedure applicable to the states as well as to the federal
government.4 This was a two-part process-the Court applied particu-
lar guarantees in the Bill of Rights to the states by virtue of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and then interpreted
those guarantees to formulate rules governing police conduct.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Between the decision in Mapp in 1961 and the close of the decade, the Court
decided such landmark cases as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the
appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants in state felony prosecutions);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion requires that certain warnings be given to defendants prior to custodial interrogation);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (requiring the presence of counsel at post-
charge identification proceedings); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (shifting the
focus of Fourth Amendment protection from property interests to privacy).
3. Although the five new Justices appointed during the 1970s began to temper the
Court's careful scrutiny of the criminal process, criminal defendants continued to enjoy some
success before the Court during this decade. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972) (extending the right to appointed counsel to misdemeanor cases involving actual
imprisonment); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (requiring that a person arrested
without a warrant be taken promptly before a judicial officer); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches after the beginning of ad-
versarial judicial proceedings); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (warrant required to search luggage).
4. The principle critics of this process were Justice John Harlan, see Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Harlan, J., joined by Clark, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting); and Judge Henry J.
Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, see HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS, Chap. 11, pp. 235-65; Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a
Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1965).
5. This was known as the process of slective incorporation. The Bill of Rights,
when drafted and ratified, was intended to apply only to the federal government. The Four-
teenth Amendment, of course, limits state action. Under the selective incorporation approach,
favored by a majority of the Justices during the 1960s, if a particular guarantee in the Bill
of Rights was considered fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, then it
was applied to the states as part of Fourteenth Amendment due process, along with all the
2
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Substantive due process in its individual rights form was reawak-
ened.
6
Although the constitutionalization of the law of criminal procedure
was partially a political phenomenon, it was not brought about by
contemporary presidential politics and the appointment process. Of the
twelve Justices who sat on the Warren Court during its most active
years,7 eight were appointed prior to 1960,' four of these by Republi-
can President Dwight D. Eisenhower.9 Of the three seats on the Court
filled during the 1960s,1" Justice Byron White, appointed by President
John F. Kennedy, turned out to be one of the Court's more conserva-
tive members. In fact, the members of the Court- during this period
came from diverse political and ideological perspectives. For example,
Justice John Harlan was a constitutional conservative, Justice Hugo
Black was a strict constructionist, and Justice William 0. Douglas was
somewhat of a nontextual free thinker.
This is not to say, however, that politics played no role in
constitutionalizing criminal procedure. Sociopolitical conditions at the
time undoubtedly, acted as the catalyst for the Court's activism. Al-
though it is presumptuous to speculate on the thought processes and
internal workings of any deliberative body, let alone to undertake this
effort with respect to the diverse personalities on the Warren Court
during the 1960s, certain predilections and emanations from the times
federal decisions interpreting the right. Selective incorporation gradually became near total.
Of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights which deal with the criminal process, only
the Fifth Amendment clause guaranteeing criminal prosecution by grand jury indictment and
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive bail have not been applied to the
states. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 2.5-.6 (2d
ed. 1992).
6. Substantive due process in its economic form, see Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), met its demise in the 1930s. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
7. Chief Justice Warren, and Associate Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, Clark,
Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, Goldberg, White, Fortas, and Marshall.
8. Chief Justice Warren, and Associate Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, Clark,
Harlan, Brennan, and Stewart.
9. Chief Justice Warren, and Associate Justices Harlan, Brennan, and Stewart.
10. Justices White and Marshall; Justices Goldberg and Fortas, who occupied the same
seat on the Court.
3
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prove insightful. Fear of domestic communism had subsided and in
1960 John Kennedy was sworn in as President on a note of optimism.
Rock-and-roll was transforming modem music and, most importantly,
the civil rights movement was forever transforming the American
sociopolitical scene. It was probably this last cultural phenomenon that
affected the Court's criminal process decisions during this period more
than any other factor. Then, as now, a disproportionate number of
criminal defendants were both poor and black.
The other main impetus behind the Supreme Court's criminal
procedure decisions in the 1960s and early 1970s was a desire for uni-
form protection throughout the states for the individual rights of crimi-
nal defendants. Other than through the adoption of a uniform code of
criminal procedure,1' which would remain the option of reluctant leg-
islative prerogative, the only means of achieving uniformity and con-
sistency in the safeguarding of individual rights against police investi-
gatory abuses was through constitutionally mandated rules.' It was
this philosophy that fueled the application of various provisions of the
Bill of Rights to the states through the process of selective incorpora-
tion.13
The application of general guarantees in the Bill of Rights to the
states, such as the protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures and the privilege against self-incrimination, was not sufficient,
however, to achieve uniformity. A history of state court refusal to
follow a general fundamental fairness approach to due process pro-
tection of individual rights led the Court to fashion relatively precise
11. The A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure was not available until
1966.
12. If the modern critic of Warren Court decisions is skeptical about intrusive and
abusive police practices during this period, they only have to examine the facts in a few of
the Court's decisions during this time to be disabused of the skepticism. See, e.g., Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (officers who were looking for gambling equipment and a
bombing suspect forcibly entered the Mapp home after being denied admittance, struggled
with and ultimately handcuffed Ms. Mapp, and finally seized obscene material after an ex-
tensive warrantless search of the premises); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (a
poorly educated, emotionally unstable 25-year old was continually interrogated for eight
hours throughout the night in the face of his refusal to answer based on the advice of
counsel and the denial of his requests to speak with his lawyer).
13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 95:1
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rules for application in the criminal processes of the state courts.
14
Thus, by the end of the 1960s, virtually all of the provisions in the
Bill of Rights respecting the criminal process, along with particularized
rules interpreting these rights, had been applied to the states via the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The result was a
rather uniform set of procedural rules that applied equally in federal
and state prosecutions.
This constitutional process, once initiated and developed, was not
quiescent. On the contrary, the particular rules formulated through the
incorporation mechanism were subject to elaboration, change, and
retrenchment. The change and retrenchment began with the shift in
presidential politics which has occurred during the past two decades.
The Republican dynasty ushered in by Richard Nixon in 1968 marked
the beginning of the contemporary ideologization of the Supreme
Court. Although the impact of the conservative politicizing of the
Court has been much debated, at least one statement respecting the
Court's philosophy can now unequivocally be made-the appointment
of Chief Justice Warren Burger and Associate (now Chief) Justice
William Rehnquist during Richard Nixon's first term signaled the
initiation of a crime control mentality that the Reagan/Bush years in
the White House have seen flourish with a vengeance. This is epito-
mized by the fact that the only member of the Court not appointed by
a Republican president during the last twenty years is Justice White,
who consistently votes in favor of the government in criminal cases.
Fueled by the so-called "war on drugs," the success of Republican
presidents in determining the composition of the Court has resulted in
the virtual dismantling of Fourth Amendment law, an" outcome-oriented
jurisprudence focusing on guilty verdicts rather than procedural viola-
14. The failure of state courts to follow the fundamental fairness approach to due
process in appointing counsel in felony cases, see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), in
part led the Court to overrule Betts in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), requir-
ing the appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Likewise, the refusal of
state courts to follow the fundamental fairness rule in deciding on the admissability of con-
fessions following police interrogation led the Supreme Court to adopt its McNabb-Mallory
rule requiring prompt presentment before a magistrate following a warrantless arrest, and to
decide Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and ultimately Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
5
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tions, and particular decisions that astonish proponents of individual
rights and titillate law-and-order advocates. Although the Court has not
reversed the incorporation process, it has deconstitutionalized criminal
procedure by liberalizing permissible police practices in some areas to
the point where application of a particular provision of the Bill of
Rights to the states, or for that matter the exclusionary rule of Mapp,
is simply irTelevant. The only possible survivor in this crime control
juggernaut is protection for the accused in the interrogation process.'
5
II. DISMANTLING FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
A. The Shift in Perspective-From Property to Privacy to Places
In Katz v. United States,6 both the petitioner and the government
characterized the controlling issue as whether a telephone booth was a
"constitutionally protected area." 17 This characterization was based on
Fourth Amendment precedents that required a physical penetration or
trespass in -the property law sense before the Fourth Amendment was
implicated. 8 Justice Stewart's majority opinion rejected this formula-
15. It is possible, of course, to attribute the reactivism of the current Supreme Court
to the activism of the Warren years and to describe it as the "who's ox is getting gored"
phenomenon or "what's good for the goose is good for the gander." There are at least
three differences, however, between the Warren years and the Rehnquist era. First, the vari-
ous members of the Warren Court were not political appointees like a majority of the mem-
bers of the current Court, appointed to fulfill a particular political agenda. Second, the Jus-
tices now on the Court have less impressive backgrounds than former Justices. On the Court
led by Earl Warren in the 1960s there was a governor (Warren), a U.S. Senator (Hugo
Black), two lawyer's lawyers (John Harlan and Abe Fortas), a head of the SEC and New
Deal reformer (William 0. Douglas), and a deputy attorney general (Byron White). Contrast-
ingly, besides White, the Court is now made up of a former Justice Department official
(William Rehnquist), and eight former lower court judges, some of whom served only a
brief tenure. Lastly, the Warren Court protected and expanded individual rights against gov-
ernmental power, the purpose for which the Bill of Rights was designed. The Rehnquist
Court, on the other hand, favors governmental decision-making and the majoritarian process,
often at the expense of under-represented minority interests. Unfortunately for this latter
group and their advocates, they cannot simply "take their ball and go home." "Home" may
turn out to be either economically or culturally impoverished or, at worst, jail.
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. IL at 349, 351.
18. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961).
6
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tion of the issue, stating that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places," and held that Katz had a justifiable expectation of privacy
in the telephone booth from which he made his calls.' Accordingly,
the authorities were required to comply with the Fourth Amendment
warrant procedure in electronically monitoring his conversations. Al-
though this shift from a property to a privacy rationale was intended
to expand constitutional protection against police search and surveil-
lance practices, ironically, the Court has recently used the expectation
of privacy formula to drastically curtail the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. This twist can be attributed, in large measure, to govern-
mental zealotry over the drug problem.
The Court was able to stand the Katz decision on its head in later
cases, not by relying on the majority opinion in Katz, but instead by
referring to Justice Harlan's narrower concurring opinion which stated,
"[m]y understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions
is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibit-
ed an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able."2 Although a wholly subjective standard would be misguid-
ed,21 even Justice Harlan assumed that the second part of his rule, the
objective portion, would be applied reasonably. 22 Nevertheless, during
the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has seized the latter aspect of
Justice Harlan's statement of the rule to fashion a justifiable or legiti-
mate expectation of privacy formula so narrow in its scope that the
Fourth Amendment is now only a minor obstacle to law enforcement
officers. The profundity of this result can be appreciated when one
realizes that in the many cases in which the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that no legitimate expectation of privacy exists, there are abso-
19. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
20. Ld. at 361.
21. A purely subjective approach would have to consider personal claims to privacy
that were clearly unreasonable, and a purely subjective expectation could be destroyed by
the government announcing hourly on television that all homes were subject to random
searches without a warrant. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 383-85 (1974).
22. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 784-93 (1971), where Justice Harlan
chastised the majority for refusing to recognize a privacy expectation that persons to whom
one speaks would not be electronically recording or transmitting the conversation.
7
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lutely no Fourth Amendment controls, i.e., the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to the police behavior involved. Consequently, governmental
authorities are free to act on whim, hunch, or rumor without even a
hint of suspicion, let alone probable cause or a warrant. It is this fea-
ture of current Fourth Amendment law which I find most disturbing.
The distortion of Katz started innocently enough in 1971 in United
States v. White,23 but by the end of that decade, the misapplication of
the privacy model had become somewhat more startling. In White, the
Supreme Court again was faced with the issue of whether there were
any Fourth Amendment restraints on the electronic monitoring of con-
versations when one party to the conversation was wired. In a long
line of earlier cases, the Court had held that there were no constitu-
tional limits on this kind of police activity, not only because a partici-
pant in a conversation assumed the risk that the other party would
divulge the information, but also because there was no physical tres-
pass.' This latter aspect of these holdings had been rejected by the
Katz decision and therefore the Court was called upon to reconsider
the issue. Writing for four members of the Court, Justice White's
plurality opinion conceded that the trespass rationale could not with-
stand Katz. However, he had little difficulty in converting the assump-
tion of the risk of disclosure portion of the earlier cases into the Katz
privacy formula. Stating that it was not necessarily subjective expecta-
tions of privacy but only those that were constitutionally justifiable
that would be protected, Justice White's opinion concluded that the
Fourth Amendment provided no protection to those who voluntarily
confided in others, regardless of whether the conversations were ver-
bally reported or electronically recorded.' Even then, the victory for
23. Id
24. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (no matter how strongly a
defendant might have trusted an apparent colleague, their seemingly private conversations are
not protected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a govern-
ment informant); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (the use of a
detectaphone by Government agents in one office to record conversations taking place in
defendant's adjoining office not violative of the Fourth Amendment); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (defendant's Fourth Amendment rights not violated unless
there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers
or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for
the iurpose of making a seizure).
25. Justice White's plurality opinion stated:
[Vol. 95:1
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law enforcement was a narrow one. Justice Black provided the fifth
vote for this holding, adhering to the narrow view from his dissenting
opinion in Katz that the Fourth Amendment simply did not apply to
electronic surveillance.26  Justices Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, and
Brennan argued that Katz recognized that all electronic monitoring
should be subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.2 7
Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular defendants in
particular situations may be or the extent to which they may in fact have relied
on the discretion of their companions. Very probably, individual defendants neither
know nor suspect that their colleagues have gone or will go to the police or are
carrying recorders or transmitters. Otherwise, conversation would cease and our
problem with these encounters would be nonexistent or far different from those
now before us. Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what
expectations of privacy are constitutionally "justifiable"-what expectations the
Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant. So far, the law per-
mits the frustrations of actual expectations of privacy by permitting authorities to
use the testimony of those associates who for one reason or another have deter-
mined to turn to the police, as well as by authorizing the use of informants in the
manner exemplified by Hoffa and Lewis. If the law gives no protection to the
wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither'should
it protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations
which are later offered in evidence to prove the State's case.
White, 401 U.S. at 751-52.
26. kd at 754 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Brennan concurred in the result on the
ground that the events in White had taken place long prior to Katz, and Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), had held that Katz applied only to electronic surveillance
which took place after the date of that decision. Justice Brennan, however, agreed with
Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Marshall that Katz outlawed the type of participant monitoring
that took place in White. Id at 755-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
27. Justice Harlan, the actual source of the plurality's objective "constitutionally justifi-
able expectation of privacy" approach, see' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring), viewed electronic monitoring by a police agent, in the absence of a
warrant, to be a constitutionally unacceptable police investigatory practice. In some of his
most eloquent language, Justice Harlan stated in his dissenting opinion in White:
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and
reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without
examining the desirability of saddling them upon society. The critical question,
therefore, is whether, under our system of government, as reflected in the Consti-
tution, we should impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or
observer without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.
The impact of the practice of third-party bugging, must, I think, be consid-
ered such as to undernine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with
one another that is characteristic of individtial relationships between citizens in a
9
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Although the White decision did not alter or expand what had
previously been a permissible police investigatory practice, one rather
surprising result does emanate from the decision. Since White stands
for the proposition that citizens have no constitutionally protected
expectation of privacy in conversations with others, the government is
free to use agents or informants to record conversations in which they
participate, regardless of whether there is even an inkling of suspicion
about the speaker's involvement in criminal activity. In other words,
there is simply no constitutional control on government when, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, no justifiable or legitimate expectation of
privacy exists.
This perversion of the Katz privacy formulation of the Fourth
Amendment has led to some truly phenomenal results. In the earliest
cases, a majority of the Court concluded that there was no constitu-
tionally recognizable expectation of privacy in bank records," phone
numbers dialed from one's telephone,29 or for a passenger in a vehi-
cle.3 ° Congress overrode the first of these decisions by statute,3' and
although modem technology has made the second somewhat more pal-
atable, the Rakas decision concerning passengers in vehicles remains
inconsistent with the subjective and realistic expectations of most citi-
zens.
More recently, the Court has continued the disingenuous applica-
tion of the privacy model by holding that there is no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in farm fields even though posted with "no trespass-
ing" signs32 on the surrounding gate or on the interior of a barn
which stands 60 feet from a house.3 Likewise, there is no privacy
protection from aerial surveillance from helicopter flights as low as
400 feet over one's backyard;' the police can also freely rummage
free society.
White, 401 U.S. at 786-87 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
29. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
30. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979).
31. Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988).
32. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
33. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
34. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
[Vol. 95:1
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through garbage placed for collection, since these items are outside the
sphere of any privacy expectation.35 The fact that the subjective ex-
pectations of most citizens are inconsistent with these conclusions
seems hardly relevant to the Justices making up a majority of the
Court because they simply have made an ideological decision to allow
law enforcement authorities to inspect these things without even a
modicum of suspicion that the target is involved in criminal activity.
Of course, these cases came before the Court in situations where crim-
inal activity had been actually occurring and it should come as no
surprise that the criminal activity usually involved drugs.36
The final touch to the Supreme Court's recent privacy ideology is
provided by then Associate Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rawlings v.
Kentucky,37 yet another drug case. In a decision inconsistent with
both the Court's precedents38 and the language of the Fourth Amend-
ment,39 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that a property in-
terest in the items seized did not necessarily provide Fourth Amend-
ment protection. On the arrival of the police, Rawlings had placed a
small cache of drugs in his female companion's purse. He contended
that even if he did not have an expectation of privacy in the purse, his
claimed ownership. of the drugs entitled him to challenge the search.'
Rawling's contention was emphatically rejected in Justice Rehnquist's
opinion, which stated that although property ownership was a factor to
be considered, "arcane" concepts of property law did not control one's
ability to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The opinion
concluded that the Fourth Amendment issue was controlled by the
inquiry of whether there was a justifiable expectation of privacy in the
35. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
36. All of the cases concerning Fourth Amendment privacy interests decided by the
Supreme Court since 1980 have involved drugs, and in all the Court has found no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy, or at best a diminished expectation, i.e., vehicles, in the area
searched.
37. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
38. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Each of these cases recognized
that the Fourth Amendment provided protection to property interests.
39. The language of the amendment makes it specifically applicable to "papers and
effects" as well as "persons" and "houses." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
40. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105.
11
Ashdown: Drugs, Ideology, and the Deconstitutionalization of Criminal Proc
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1
place searched.41 Justice Rehnquist ignored the precise language of
the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated ... ."42 Thus, property claims were
prevented from being used to circumvent the Court's narrow privacy
jurisprudence, again placing the focus on constitutionally protected
places, it had been prior to the decision in Kat.
43
The Court's objective privacy formula has had one primary advan-
tage for law enforcement. It has avoided the exclusion of evidence
(usually drugs) from criminal trials and has allowed the Court to dis-
creetly undermine the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, without
directly overruling that decision." This law enforcement ideology and
judicial "war on drugs" has had, however, some unfortunate jurispru-
dential consequences, the foremost of which is the drastic decline in
constitutional protection from undue police search and seizure practic-
es.
A Supreme Court conclusion that a person enjoys no constitution-
ally legitimate expectation of privacy in, for example, his bank records,
telephone records, automobile, 45 barn, garbage, or with respect to per-
41. Id at 105-06.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (emphasis added).
43. Although the Katz decision applied Fourth Amendment protection to privacy inter-
ests, this was intended as an expansion, not as exclusion. Justice Stewart's majority opinion
in Katz stated, "[tihe Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
'right of privacy.' That amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of gov-
ernmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with priva-
cy at all." 389 U.S. at 350.
44. The Court has not been nearly as successful in avoiding another politically contro-
versial issue-legalized abortion-created by the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Thomburgh V.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Webster v. Re-
productive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497
U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Planned Parenthood of S.E.
Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
45. A passenger in an automobile has no expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Whereas, in a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held
that an owner/driver has only a diminished expectation of privacy which allows the police
12
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sons with whom he speaks means that the Fourth Amendment is whol-
ly inapplicable and that the police are free to do whatever they, please
on whim without even a hint of suspicion, let alone probable cause or
a warrant. It is this wholesale elimination of Fourth Amendment con-
trol on official investigative practices that is both philosophically and
pragmatically problematic. No one would suggest that the police
should not be able to investigate such things as those listed above, but
one would think that some justification should be required-such as
reasonable suspicion or probable cause-before a person becomes the
target of official scrutiny and his affairs or property are invaded. The
Court's privacy decisions have permitted circumvention of the
exclusionary rule, and they have also left Fourth Amendment law with
this troubling legacy.
As a result, and another unfortunate consequence of this line of
cases, many state courts have relied on their own state constitutions to
provide more realistic recognition of privacy expectations and concom-
itant legal protection against unjustified invasion of these interests.4
to search a vehicle without a warrant. This has been justified on the theory that an automo-
bile moves around in public, that it is possible to see inside, and that it and the driver are
subject to regulation by the state. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
368-69 (1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
46. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985) (declining to apply "totality
of circumstances" test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) to search warrant affidavits
based on information provided by confidential informants); People v. Ruggles, 702 P.2d 170
(Cal. 1985) (warrantless search with probable cause of briefcase in vehicle violates search
and seizure clause of state constitution); People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1985) (in-
stallation and continued presence of beeper to locate chemical drum in residence violates
search and seizure clause of Colorado Constitution); State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn.
1990) (rejecting good faith exception to exclusionary rule of United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984)); State v. Bailey, 523 A.2d 535 (Del. 1987) (Delaware statute provides
broader double jeopardy protections than does Sixth Amendment to United States Constitu-
tion); State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981) (Florida Constitution provides broader
protection against wiretapping of private telephone conversations than does United States
Constitution); People v. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1979) (once an attorney has entered
a proceeding, thereby signifying that the police should cease questioning, a defendant in
custody may not be further interrogated in the absence of counsel); State v. Cavanaugh, 545
N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio 1988) (under Ohio Constitution, probable cause for search of defendant
and seizure of pills found on his person did not exist based on citizen informant's tip);
Commonwealth v. Bussey, 404 A.2d 1309 (Pa. 1979) (Pennsylvania broadens Miranda
13
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This process, sometimes referred to as reverse federalism,47 has had
the effect of providing state citizens with greater protection against
state law enforcement practices than is available in the federal criminal
process against invasions of privacy by federal law enforcement agents.
It is ironic that this is a state of affairs diametrically contrary to the
situation that originally led to the incorporation approach to the crimi-
nal process. 8 Incorporation had been an effort to constitutionalize
state rules and make them consistent with more stringent federal stan-
dards for the protection of the rights of criminal defendants in state
courts. The recent Court-provided leniency to federal law enforcement
officials has aided the federal drug enforcement effort, the so-called
"war on drugs," and no doubt has made a substantial contribution to
the deluge of drug cases on federal courts and the overcrowding of
federal prisons with drug offenders.
B. Investigative Practices Not Amounting to Searches or Seizures
1. The No Search Rationale
Closely aligned with the no privacy/no protection cases is the
Supreme Court's no search approach to Fourth Amendment law. Al-
though different in theory, the result is the same-no Fourth Amend-
protections by requiring explicit waiver of such rights); State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112
(Wash. 1990) (Washington's Constitution provides greater protection of defendant's privacy
interest in garbage bags left outside the home than does United States Supreme Court in
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, (1988)); State v. Oxier, 338 S.E.2d 360 (W. Va.
1985) (prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant regarding pretrial silence and comment on
that silence violates due process clause of state constitution); State v. Pitsch, 369 N.W.2d
711 (Wis. 1985) (Wisconsin' high court adopts more protective standards for defendants
complaining of ineffective assistance of counsel than is mandated by United States Supreme
Court under Fourteenth Amendment); State v. Davis, 686 P.2d 1143 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)
(Washington court expands on Miranda rights afforded to juveniles when suspect engages in
post-arrest silence); see also Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter 3. Galie, Models of Post-Incorpo-
ration Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55
U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 318-19 (1986).
47. See, e.g., Peter Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our
Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 57 (1987); Michael G. Collins, The Right to Avoid
Trial: Justifying Federal Court Intervention Into Ongoing State Court Proceedings, 66 N.C.
L. REV. 49, 85-86 nn.201 & 204 (1987).
48. See supra notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 95:1
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ment coverage. These cases involve situations in which the Court has
recognized some expectation of privacy (luggage and automobiles), but
because of the nature of the police activity, the Court has ultimately
concluded that there was no search.
The most important of these cases to law enforcement has proved
to be United States v. Place.49 In a conclusion unnecessary to the
holding,50 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion declared that a canine
sniff search of luggage in a public place was so minimally intrusive
that it did not amount to a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 51 This, like the no privacy rationale, means that there
are consequently no Fourth Amendment restrictions on this type of
official investigatory activity. Not even suspicion is necessary before
luggage can randomly (or whimsically, for that matter) be subjected to
drug-sniffing dogs. The advantage of Supreme Court tolerance of this
practice to law enforcement is the bootstrapping analysis that it initi-
ates. Dogs can meander around luggage until a positive reaction is
obtained, which alone or in combination with other factors will provide
probable cause to obtain a warrant to search the luggage. Furthermore,
as suggested by the majority in Place, when supported by, specific
articulable facts, luggage can be detained while a warrant is being
sought.
52
The Place decision is an archetype of the Court's law enforcement
focus. In earlier cases, as well as in Place itself, the Court recognized
"that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of personal
49. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
50. In Place, federal agents stopped the respondent at La Guardia Airport based on
reasonable suspicion that he was a drug courier. They seized his luggage and took the bags
to Kennedy Airport where they were subjected to a trained narcotics dog who reacted posi-
tively to one of them. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion held that this seizure should be
judged by the Terry standards for a brief investigative detention, and concluded that the 90-
minute delay exceeded the Terry limits. The dog sniff issue was neither reached by the
court of appeals nor briefed and argued in the Supreme Court. The majority's statements
about a dog sniff not amounting to a search was thus unnecessary to the holding and is
thus dicta, although it has been consistently followed by the federal courts. Id. at 719-20
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in the result); i& at 723-24 (Blackmun, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., concurring).
51. L at 707.
52. Id
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luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 5 3 Therefore, it
is somewhat surprising that a majority of the Court concluded that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to dog inspections of luggage. Al-
though Justice O'Connor's majority opinion characterized the procedure
as limited, both in terms of its intrusiveness and as to the nature of
the information obtained, it ignored the fact that the dog inspection
reveals something about a place the Court itself has recognized as
private. To this extent, Place is inconsistent with the Court's notion of
privacy, an expectation of which requires at least reasonable suspicion
for invasion. The incongruity of this aspect of the Place decision with
the privacy analysis is revealed by the logical corollary of the decision
which would permit authorities to randomly utilize dogs to smell
around houses and businesses without any suspicion whatsoever.
54
The other major "no search" cases are the electronic tracking
decisions in United States v. Knotts
55 and United States v. Karo.56
These cases involved the installation of an electronic "beeper" (a bat-
tery operated radio transmitter) into a container of chemicals used to
manufacture illicit drugs. Monitoring of the beeper signal was then
utilized, along with visual surveillance, to track the container as it was
carried in the suspect's vehicle to the place eventually searched. De-
spite the fact that the Court has recognized a privacy interest in a
vehicle, albeit diminished, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Knotts held that such electronic tracking did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search since the same ends could have been accomplished
53. Id at 706.
54. This realization has led at least a couple of courts to reject the reasoning of
Place.under their own state constitutions. See People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1990); and McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991), both rejecting
the Place analysis and concluding that the focus should be on whether the investigative
procedure reveals the contents of a private place. These decisions consequently held that at
least reasonable suspicion that drugs are present is required for a dog sniff search of lug-
gage, a residence or a commercial building. But see United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d
1359 (2d Cir. 1985), attempting to distinguish between sniffs of luggage and sniffs of
homes. See also Arnold Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1246-48 (1983); Martin Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in
the Classroom, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 844-47 (1980).
55. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
56. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
[Vol. 95:1
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by visual surveillance from public places.57 This ignores, of course,
the fact that this kind of electronic tracking enhances (and perfects)
visual monitoring, making it much more effective and precise; this is
exactly why it is used. It is rather easy for a visual observer to lose a
vehicle in traffic or in an unfamiliar neighborhood, but the electronic
tracker is virtually infallible and will always reveal its whereabouts.
The implication from Knotts is unsettling in that the police can place
an electronic tracking device on a vehicle and trace its every move-
ment without even thinking about the Fourth Amendment.
The conclusion in Knotts is also inconsistent with the follow-up
decision in United States v. Karo, which limited the Knotts holding,
although not in a terribly meaningful way. 8 Noting that it would be
unquestionably unreasonable to enter a residence without a warrant to
verify that an object was located inside, Justice White's majority opin-
ion concluded that it was equally unreasonable to utilize an electronic
device to obtain this information in the absence of a search warrant.59
The difference for the majority in Karo was that the surveillance went
beyond what could be obtained by visual observation in public and
entered a private residence protected by an expectation of privacy.
There is also, however, some privacy expectation in an automo-
bile.' The Knotts majority chose to ignore the fact that placing a
beeper in an object which is then tracked inside a vehicle, like in
57. Although in Karo the Court held that Knotts did not permit electronic tracking
inside a residence in the absence of a search warrant, the effect of that decision is rather
limited in light of Knotts. All law enforcement agents need do to take advantage of Karo-
Knotts is stop gathering the information relied upon in application for the warrant at the
point where the container enters a private residence. In fact, the additional information ob-
tained in Karo-that the container of chemicals is inside the home-is superfluous to the
issuance of the warrant where law enforcement personnel have witnessed the container being
taken inside. The only time when this additional information would be important is where
there has been some lapse of time in applying for the warrant and probable cause would
require some assurance that the chemicals are still inside.
58. See supra note 51.
59. 468 U.S. at 714.
60. The Court has concluded that the expectation of privacy in a vehicle is dimin-
ished. This allows an automobile to be searched without a warrant, but does not dispense
with the Fourth Amendment or probable cause requirement. See, e.g., California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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Karo, tells authorities something about what is in the vehicle and
whether it remains there. This is something that cannot clearly be
accomplished by visual surveillance, especially when the vehicle is
making stops. Although the Supreme Court has shown characteristic
leniency toward the search of vehicles, it had never before held the
Fourth Amendment completely irrelevant with respect to police detec-
tion practices aimed at them.6
2. The No Seizure Rationale
The cousin of the "no- search" notion is the "no seizure" rule.
Again, it should come as no surprise that this concept had its genesis
in drug courier cases. The Drug Enforcement Administration's "drug
courier profile" presented the federal courts with the issue of whether
the various factors used in the profile provided the reasonable suspi-
cion necessary to stop an individual for investigation.62 In the first
such case to reach the Supreme Court, United States v. Mendenhall,
63
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion avoided that issue by concluding
that when federal drug agents approached Ms. Mendenhall in an airline
terminal, identified themselves, and asked to see her ticket and identifi-
cation, she had not been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." This meant that since there had been no seizure, the
61. Although in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court held that a passen-
ger in an automobile had no expectation of privacy in the vehicle, it is highly unlikely that
the police would randomly stop a vehicle in the hope of finding contraband which could be
linked to a passenger. In any event, at least reasonable suspicion for the stop would be
necessary. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990), where drunk driving checkpoints were upheld without the need for
individualized suspicion, the Court nevertheless engaged in a Fourth Amendment balancing
process and required that a standardized procedure be followed.
62. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and discussion infra text accompanying
notes 89-100. Factors utilized in the profile include such things as the cities to and from
which the suspect is traveling, age and style of dress, whether luggage is carried or
claimed, method of payment for ticket, and point at which the suspect leaves the plane.
63. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
64. Justice Stewart defined a "seizure" in the following manner: "We conclude that a
person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave." Id at 554.
[Vol. 95:1
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agents needed 'no justification, reasonable suspicion or otherwise, for
stopping Ms. Mendenhall.65
Justice Stewart's rather revolutionary "no seizure" analysis in
Mendenhall seemingly garnered the support of a majority of the Justic-
es in the next drug courier case to come before the Court. Although
Justice White's plurality opinion in Florida v. Royer" concluded that
Royer had been effectively seized, he intimated that merely approach-
ing the suspect and asking to examine his driver's license would not
have amounted to a seizure.67 Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion,
which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor,
agreed "with the plurality's intimation that when the detectives first
approached and questioned Royer, no seizure occurred and thus the
constitutional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment were not in-
voked."
68
Finally, in the "factory survey" case, Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Delgado,69 a majority of the Justices plainly accepted the
"no seizure" rule. Under the factory survey procedure, INS agents,
with a general warrant or the consent of the employer, would survey
65. Rehnquist, J., joined this part of the Stewart opinion. Powell, J., joined by Chief
Justice Burger, and Blackmun, J., concurred, noting that although they did "not necessarily
disagree" with the Stewart analysis, they preferred to uphold the action on the ground that
reasonable suspicion was present. White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and, Stevens, JJ.,
dissented, objecting that the government should not be allowed to raise the no-seizure issue
for the first time before the Supreme Court.
66. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (joined by Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
67. Although the plurality concluded that Royer had been seized under Justice
Stewart's test in Mendenhall, Justice White's plurality opinion also stated
law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely ap-
proaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if
he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person
is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his volun-
tary answers to such questions . . . . If there is no detention-no seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-then no constitutional rights have been in-
fringed.
[Ajsking for and examining Royer's ticket and driver's license were no
doubt permissible in themselves ....
460 U.S. at 497-98, 501.
68. Id at 523.
69. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
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the entire work force, asking questions of the workers and if the an-
swer was unsatisfactory or alienage was admitted, asking for immi-
gration papers. Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
had held first that the entire work force was seized during the survey
because stationing agents at the doors meant that "a reasonable worker
would have believed that he was not free to leave," and second, that
questioning of individual workers was a seizure requiring individual-
ized reasonable suspicion,7 ° Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion con-
cluded that "the encounters were classic consensual encounters rather
than Fourth Amendment seizures."7'
It seems to me that any honest and sensible person would have to
seriously question the "no seizure" logic and the Court's conclusion in
Delgado. Justice Rehnquist argued in Delgado that the worker's free-
dom was constrained by their obligations to their employer and that
the agents poised at the doors were there only to ensure that everyone
was questioned. He stated that the agents posed no reasonable threat of
detention to the workers as they moved around the factory on their job
assignments. He also noted that the agents at the doors did not prevent
anyone from leaving and "the mere possibility that [workers] would be
questioned if they sought to leave ... should not have resulted in any
reasonable apprehension by any of them that they would be seized or
detained in any meaningful way. 72 It certainly would not be difficult
for any court which utilized this logic also to conclude, as did the
Delgado majority, that individual questioning did not constitute a sei-
zure either, because it was only a brief encounter and it was obvious
that the INS agents were only questioning people.73 Not even Chuck
Norris or Mike Tyson would believe this, let alone garment or migrant
workers, some of whom were resident (if not illegal) aliens. The
Delgado decision is pure law enforcement fiction.
Nevertheless, Delgado became the springboard for firmly estab-
lishing the "no seizure" principle in (or outside of) Fourth Amendment
70. 1d at 214.
71. Id at 220.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss1/4
1992] DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
jurisprudence. The ensuing decision in Florida v. Bostick74 is a clas-
sic encounter with the deconstitutionalization phenomenon. In Bostick,
the Court not only made it clear that "even when officers have no
basis for suspecting a particular individual, they generally may ask
questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identifica-
tion, and request consent to search his or her luggage," 5 the majority
also concluded that this all may take place within the confines of a
bus. Confronted with Bostick's argument that his situation was differ-
ent than the other police encounter cases because he was approached
by armed officers within the confines of a bus at a time when the bus
was about to depart from an intermediate stop in the journey, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion trotted out Delgado. Recognizing that
Bostick was somewhat confined and would not have felt free to leave
a departing bus, Justice O'Connor argued that, as in Delgado, the lack
of freedom of movement was due to Bostick's own voluntary
choice-his decision to take the bus-and not necessarily the police
conduct at issue. Under such circumstances, the majority concluded
that the appropriate inquiry was not whether a reasonable person would
feel free to leave, but "whether a reasonable person would feel free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
76
Not only is the Delgado-Bostick rule disingenuous, the entire "no
seizure" line of cases is based on a fictitious premise. First, in both
Delgado and Bostick, the defendant's predicament obviously was
caused by voluntary individual choices, but the Court allowed the po-
lice to take advantage of those choices to create confinement where it
otherwise would not have existed (and here I am equating confinement
with being seized, i.e., a reasonable person would not believe they
were free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter). Does the
Delgado-Bostick rule now mean that law enforcement officials, without
suspicion, can go to a person's home, station officers at all exits,
question those present, and ask for identification and permission to
search?77 Is it only a matter of time until the drug courier profile
74. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
75. Id at 2386.
76. Id at 2387.
77. Id at 2394 (Marshall, L, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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investigation and the bus survey extends to the passenger compartment
of commercial airplanes?7" Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in
Bostick stated, in fact, that "[o]ur Fourth Amendment inquiry in this
case-whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the
officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter-applies equally
to police encounters that take place on trains, planes and city
streets. 79
Second, and more importantly, the no seizure notion is unadulter-
ated sophistry. Hardly anyone who is confronted and questioned by
armed officers, asked for identification and permission to search, be-
lieves he is free to do much of anything, certainly not refuse to an-
swer or walk away. Anyone with a lick' of sense knows that doing
these things will only aggravate the situation and cause him more
trouble. Despite Justice O'Connor's instruction that "a refusal to coop-
erate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective
justification needed for a detention or seizure,"80 no one knows this
or would believe it if he did.8 Practically speaking, even assuming
someone had the savvy to exercise his constitutional rights and the
encounter intensified into a seizure, any discovery of contraband and
hindsight would surely provide the necessary justification the detention
or seizure. Even if a defendant were ultimately to prevail under Justice
O'Connor's admonition, he would have to await arrest, charges, and a
successful motion to suppress. We know the likelihood of the latter in
the current legal and political climate. If, on the other hand, contra-
band is not revealed during the intensified encounter, the citizen is of
course spared prosecution, leaving him with only a substantial invasion
of his privacy for which there is no practical remedy.
78. The Bostick procedure already has been applied to train passengers. See Guadalupe
v. United States, 585 A.2d 1348 (D.C. 1991). One would think, however, that in the case
of commercial flights, the consent of the carrier would have to be obtained.
79. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388.
80. Id. at 2387.
81. Somewhat inconsistent with Justice O'Connor's admonition that a refusal to coop-
erate cannot provide justification for intensification of the investigation is California v.
Hodari D., 11I S. Ct. 1547 (1991), where Justice Scalia's majority opinion concluded that
chasing a suspect who decides to leave the scene at the sign of approaching police does
not amount to a seizure.
[Vol. 95"I
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The irony in the "no seizure" rule is that the fatuous logic on
which it is based is unavailing in the very circumstance which is the
basis for its justification, i.e., where the option to leave or otherwise
terminate the encounter is exercised. Officers are free to persist and
pursue, and as long as the person does not submit or is not subdued,
he has not been seized. In California v. Hodari D., 2 the Supreme
Court held that a juvenile who left the scene when a cruiser ap-
proached was not seized until he was actually tackled by Officer
Pertoso after the officer had pursued him. Even though the issue was
whether Hodari D. had been seized, Justice Scalia's majority opinion
often spoke of an "arrest" and defined this point as either an applica-
tion of physical force or submission to the assertion of authority.83
Confronted by the respondent's argument that the officer's show of
authority by pursuing him conveyed the message that he was not free
to leave, and he had therefore been seized under Justice Stewart's
Mendenhall test, Justice Scalia responded that the "not free to leave"
standard was "a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a sei-
zure.
84
The convolution in all this is that the Mendenhall-Bostick "no
seizure" rule does not even mean what it says. After Hodari D., even
if a citizen resists the efforts of law enforcement officers and tries to
leave, the officers can persist. If evidence then turns UPS or consent
to search is ultimately obtained, there is no Fourth Amendment obsta-
cle.86 Taken literally, the Hodari D. opinion means that the police
82. Id
83. Id at 1551.
84. Id To be sure, Hodari D. does not represent the typical police/citizen encounter.
Hodari D. ran on seeing the police cruiser prior to actually being confronted by Officer
Pertoso. But Justice Scalia's majority opinion makes clear that this fact did not affect the
analysis; that "an arrest requires either physical force ...or, when that is absent, submis-
sion to the assertion of authority." Id In fact, Justice Scalia suggests that even the actual
application of physical force might not be sufficient where the suspect does not yield. Id at
1550.
85. In Hodari D. the respondent tossed away a "rock" of crack cocaine as he was
being pursued by Officer Pertoso.
86. See State v. Shahid, 813 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), holding that an officer
who drew his weapon and ordered the suspect to raise his hands did not effect a "seizure"
under Hodari D. at a point where the suspect discarded a quantity of cocaine before fully
complying with the officer's command. But see United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116 (4th
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can fire their weapons at a fleeing suspect and if he is not hit, there
has been no seizure. This "show of authority" would be "a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition for a seizure." However, this clearly
contradicts both the Court's earlier holding in Tennessee v. Garner
7
that the Fourth Amendment bars the police, even when acting with
probable cause, from shooting a fleeing, nondangerous felon, and Jus-
tice Stewart's own description of a seizure in Mendenhall.88
The above analysis may suggest that unless shot while fleeing, the
guilty have no rights. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion virtually
admits as much when she says that the "reasonable person" test pre-
supposes an "innocent person."89 This kind of mentality ignores at
least three things. First, our Constitution and philosophical ideals sug-
gest that those accused of crime are supposed to have rights. Second,
not everyone exposed to a "voluntary consensual encounter" is carrying
drugs and if no drugs are detected in the encounter there will be no
arrest and criminal prosecution to test the legality of the police actions.
Third, someday the "drug problem" will no longer be the political
phenomenon that it is now and the "war on drugs" will be over,90
leaving the no search/no seizure rules to facilitate the targeting of
other offenses in derogation of the Fourth Amendment.
In this regard, the most striking thing about the Mendenhall-Royer-
Delgado-Bostick line of cases is that they virtually overrule one aspect
of Terry v. Ohio.91 In Terry, the Court relied on the Fourth
Amendment's Reasonableness Clause and its recently adopted balanc-
ing test' to justify police investigatory practices on less than proba-
Cir. 1991) (holding that persistent police efforts to gain consent to search after an initial
refusal followed by pursuit of the fleeing suspect amounted to a seizure).
87. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
88. "Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person
did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display
of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion) (emphasis added).
89. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388.
90. It should come as no surprise that all of the no search/no seizure cases, except
one (Delgado), involved drugs.
91. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
92. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), employing the Fourth
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ble cause. The Court held that where an officer is investigating crimi-
nal activity and has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect is
armed and dangerous, he is justified in making a limited patdown
search for weapons. Although in Terry the Court said it was
"decid[ing] nothing... concerning the constitutional propriety of an
investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause," 93 this was im-
plicit in the holding,' as later cases came to recognize.' Thus, until
Justice Stewart articulated his "no seizure" concept in Mendenhall,
Terry stood for the proposition that a person could be detained for
investigation on less than probable cause, but only if the detaining
officers had articulable suspicion or "a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activi-
ty."96 This minimal level of justification for an investigative stop no
longer is necessary following the advent of the "no seizure" rule, un-
less, according to Justice O'Connor's language in .Florida v. Bostick,
"the officers ... point guns at [the suspect] or otherwise threaten
him." 97 This type of police activity, however, sounds more like an
arrest rather than a Terry stop and seemingly writes the need for a
Terry analysis out of Fourth Amendment seizure law, i.e., there is ei-
ther no seizure or there is an arrest. 98 Revealingly, Justice Scalia's
Amendment's Reasonableness Clause and "balancing the need to search [or seize] against
the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails" to conclude that area-wide probable cause
would justify the issuance of a warrant to investigate for housing and building code viola-
tions.
93. 392 U.S. at 19.
94. The Court appears to adopt a standard less than probable cause for an investiga-
tive stop when in the holding it refers to a situation "where a police officer observes un-
usual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that crimi-
nal activity may be afoot." Id at 30. Justice Harlan also pointed out in his concurring
opinion that "if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with
a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to
make a forcible stop . . . . I would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this
case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime."
Id at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
95. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411 (1981); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
96. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.
97. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
98. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analy-
sis After Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 799 (1991).
25
Ashdown: Drugs, Ideology, and the Deconstitutionalization of Criminal Proc
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
opinion in California v. Hodari D. analyzes the seizure issue in terms
of the common law of arrest, consistently referring to the point at
which an "arrest" occurs.99
Of course, Terry will still be useful to law enforcement as an
escalating mechanism where the initial stop and questioning arguably
produce actual articulable suspicion justifying further and more lengthy
detention (and probably a frisk)."° The focus of Fourth Amendment
seizure law, however, should be on the original encounter where, as in
Terry and its progeny, reasonable suspicion is required in order for
law enforcement officers to invade one's space and privacy. This as-
pect of the Terry decision has largely been eliminated from search and
seizure law by the new "no seizure' rule, and has relegated that part
of the case to a bootstrapping device permitting intensified investiga-
tion following the initial "no seizure" stop. It is instructive to note that
the "no seizure" rationale originated and evolved in drug cases, and is
generally unnecessary outside of that context;"e ' this is another exam-
ple of the drug "tail" wagging the constitutional "dog." Irrespective of
the reasons for the rule, a person is no longer seized when he is
stopped by police, asked questions, asked for identification and permis-
sion to search his possessions, and even chased if he decides to
leave," unless guns are drawn or there is other more threatening
behavior.103
99. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1550-51. This led to Justice Steven's response in dissent
that the majority was ignoring the teachings of Terry. He remarked, "One consequence of
[the Court's] conclusion is that the point at which the interaction between citizen and police
officer becomes a seizure occurs, not when a reasonable citizen believes he or she is no
longer free to go, but rather, only after the officer exercises control over the citizen," id. at
1559-60, i.e., an arrest.
100. The reasonable suspicion requirement would also still seemingly apply to the stop-
ping of vehicles. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325 (1990).
101. Most drug offenses, being possessory in nature, produce little observable evidence
other than through informants and undercover agents and generalizations about the patterns
and practices of drug offenders (the so-called drug courier profiles). The "no seizure" inves-
tigation eliminates the need to rely on these.
102. See California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (holding defendant, who fled
upon seeing an approaching police car, not seized when chased by police officer).
103. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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C. Balancing and Disingenuity
Needless to say, when the Court hag been called upon in some
fashion to consider and weigh individual privacy against the interests
of law enforcement, the result is preordained. Contemporary use of the
Camara-Terry balancing test in the administrative search area has
amounted to outright vindication of whatever law enforcement practice
happens to be challenged. Interestingly, and clearly inconsistent with
the situations in Camara and Terry,'04 in recent cases the govern-
ment has argued, and the Court has held, that no particularized justifi-
cation whatsoever is necessary for the intrusion. This is consistent,
however, with the Court's no privacy/no search/no seizure thinking and
means that a considerable area of law enforcement investigatory prac-
tices are beyond constitutional control.
The drug testing cases typify the new balancing perspective. In
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab'05 and Skinne'r v.
Railway Labor Executives Assoc., 1 6 a majority struck the Camara
balance by completely discounting the individual privacy interest and
upholding two suspicionless blood and urine testing programs. Even
though the Court recognized the obvious privacy interest of the em-
ployees involved, albeit characterizing it as diminished because of the
nature of the employment 7 (and thus ignoring the overall intrusive-
ness of the practice), it was given virtually no weight in the balance.
This was the case even though the asserted overriding nature of the
governmental interests was questionable.'
In Von Raab, the majority concluded that urinalysis testing of
Customs Service employees, who applied for positions involving the
interdiction of drugs or the carrying of a firearm, served the compel-
ling governmental interest of protecting the integrity of the nation's
borders and the life of the citizenry. 10 8 However, as Justice Scalia
104. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
105. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
106. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
107. I& at 627.
108. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672.
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pointed out in his dissenting opinion, there was absolutely no evidence
of drug usage by Customs Service employees or that drug use had
compromised the drug enforcement effort or resulted in the misuse of
weapons. 9 The real reason for the drug testing rules at Customs
was admitted in the Government's brief-to set an example and show
the public that the government is serious about drug enforcement and
that its enforcement officers are clean.11 Likewise, in Skinner, the
safety justification given for the Federal Railroad Administration's drug
testing regulations is undermined by the fact that the testing is manda-
tory only after train accidents or incidents.'
Although the Supreme Court's balancing in these cases was infect-
ed by the claim that the programs were not designed to serve law
enforcement goals, the government's interest was overweighed and then
balanced against an undervalued individual privacy interest in order to
permit suspicionless drug testing practices. The remarkable thing about
Von Raab and Skinner is not that drug testing was constitutionally
sanctioned, but that it was given the Court's blessing without the re-
quirement of individualized suspicion. All of the earlier cases balanc-
ing the individual against the law enforcement interest had dispensed
with the formal probable cause and warrant requirements, but neverthe-
less had demanded some justification for the intrusion.' 12 Regardless,
109. Id. at 680.
110. Ld. at 687.
111. The heavy reliance the Court placed on the safety factor in Skinner and Von Raab
of course applies to other activities and professions, e.g., airline pilots, airline traffic con-
trollers, athletes physicians.
112. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1988) (regulations mandating testing of railroad employees without requiring individualized
suspicion held violative of employees' Fourth Amendment rights); Lovvom v. City of Chat-
tanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (city's mandatory urinalysis testing of its fire fight-
ers, on a department-wide basis, without reasonable cause or suspicion to believe that fire
fighters tested or used controlled substances, violated their Fourth Amendment rights); Na-
tional Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (enjoining
Department of Defense from implementing mandatory urinalysis drug-testing program for
certain civilian employees); National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 733 F. Supp.
403 (D.D.C. 1990) (government's interest in integrity of its borders and protecting sensitive
information could not justify proposed random urinalysis testing of plant protection officers,
quarantine officers, or computer specialists); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in
part & vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug-testing program held to be an uncon-
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the United States Supreme Court remained faithful to its drug enforce-
ment policy and permitted additional drug detection practices without
any justification for the particular individual intrusion in question.
Similarly, when the sobriety checkpoint issue reached the Supreme
Court, the result of the balancing process was entirely predictable.
113
Again the issue was framed in terms of whether a suspicionless inves-
tigatory practice was permissible. Although Justice Rehnquist's majori-
ty opinion in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz'" characterized
the checkpoint stops as a "seizure," he had no difficulty in balancing
away the need for suspicion as a prerequisite-the state's profound
interest in controlling drunk driving clearly outweighed the minimal
intrusion at the checkpoint. The difficulty with this conclusion, which
reads as almost perfunctory, is that it again overvalues the state inter-
est and undervalues individual privacy.
No one would question the importance of preventing drunk driv-
ing. This is not, however, the correct state interest to be balanced in
the Sitz equation. More particularly, the relevant government interest in
Sitz is the significance or effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in com-
bating the drunk driving problem. Because of this improper focus,
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion overemphasized the state's side of
the balance. There was little evidence that the checkpoints were suc-
cessful in getting drunk drivers off the road115 or that they were
more successful than conventional law enforcement techniques for de-
tecting drunk driving, where reasonable suspicion is the linchpin.
It is the availability of traditional law enforcement techniques
which distinguishes the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz from the permanent
highway checkpoints to detect illegal aliens involved in United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte,"6 the case on which Justice Rehnquist primarily
stitutional search and seizure, violative of Sixth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimi-
nation, penumbral rights to privacy, and Due Process Clause).
113. The Supreme Court's decision was predictable even though lower courts had split
on the constitutionality of this procedure.
114. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
115. Id at 454.
116. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In addition to the fact that checkpoints are virtually the
only way to detect the transportation of illegal aliens, the immigration checkpoints in Marti-
nez-Fuerte differ from the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz in at least three other ways. First, the
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relied. There is very little outwardly observable evidence involved in
smuggling illegal aliens, which necessitates the use of checkpoints as a
detection practice. Drunk driving, on the other hand, is by its very
nature observable, certainly so when it becomes dangerous. That is
what makes it illegal. Thus, the lack of evidence of the utility of the
checkpoint procedure, 17 as well as the need for it, diminishes the
value of the governmental interest.
On the other side of the balance, Justice Rehnquist termed the
intrusion at these checkpoints slight."' His majority opinion
downplayed the conclusion of the Michigan Court of Appeals that the
subjective intrusion on motorists was substantial because of the poten-
tial to generate fear and surprise. He concluded that "[t]he 'fear and
surprise' to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been
drinking but rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law abiding
motorists by the nature of the stop."" 9 Be that as it may, it begs the
question, for Justice Rehnquist fails to consider carefully "the fear and
surprise engendered in law abiding motorists" by being stopped at a
sobriety checkpoint at night.
The inconsistency in the Court's Fourth Amendment analyses is
exposed in Sitz by Justice Rehnquist's characterization of the sobriety
checkpoint as a "seizure," 2' thus admitting that it is more intrusive
than the so-called "no seizure" encounter, but at the same time de-
scribing it as "slight."'' It is fair to say that a certain amount of
anxiety (if not fear) and surprise would be engendered in most pedes-
trians who were stopped by a law enforcement officer, questioned and
immigration checkpoint is permanent and fixed instead of mobile and thus the element of
surprise is reduced. Second, checking a driver's license or identification papers at an immi-
gration checkpoint is much more standardized than discretionary efforts to detect drunk
driving at a sobriety checkpoint. Lastly, many of the stops at the permanent checkpoint take
place during the daylight hours whereas the sobriety stops are almost always at night, there-
by increasing their intrusiveness. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
and Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 470 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
118. Id. at 451.
119. Id. at 452.
120. Id at 540.
121. Id at 451.
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asked for identification. However else it might be explained, the sur-
prise and intrusion resulting from having one's vehicle unexpectedly
pulled over at night by the police (admittedly more invasive than the
street encounter) is more than "slight."
Comparing the situation with the checkpoint to detect illegal aliens
involved in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte is, as pointed out by
Justice Stevens, at best disingenuous. The checkpoint in Martinez-
Fuerte was permanent and most of the stops were made in the day-
light, hours, removing much of the elements of anxiety and
surprise. t2 Additionally, 'the detection of illegal aliens involves the
exercise of far less discretion than does the detention of motorists sus-
pected of drunk driving."z Finally, checkpoints are a necessary in-
vestigative practice with respect to the smuggling of illegal aliens,
whereas they are not essential to the discovery of driving under the
influence. 124
The Supreme Court's recent balancing cases actually do not in-
volve balancing at all because all the weight is placed on the
government's side of the scale. They are, however, absolutely consis-
tent with the Court's no Fourth Amendment coverage approach, where
no particularized justification, i.e., not even suspicion, is needed for
police investigatory practices. There is consequently no real need to
attack or overrule the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio. For if the
dictates of the Fourth Amendment do not apply, there is no constitu-
tional violation, and no need to consider the exclusion of evidence.
The balancing cases complete a nice quadrangle of such theories: no
privacy, no search, no seizure, no balancing.
D. Good Faith, Probable Cause, and Open Season on Automobiles
The demise of constitutional control or influence over search and
seizure law can truly be appreciated when the cases and theories dis-
122. L at 463 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
123. Checking for illegal aliens involves the standardized practice of inspecting drivers
licenses and identification papers whereas detecting drunk driving at a sobriety checkpoint
permits virtually unlimited discretion with respect to what kind of suspicion will result in
further detention of a motorist. Id. at 464-65.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
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cussed above are considered in conjunction with the Court's decisions
regarding the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,"z the
watered-down probable cause standard," 6 and the lack of the need
for a search warrant in the law enforcement scrutiny of anything con-
nected with an automobile."7 These latter holdings stand for nothing
less than the propositions that in some situations the Warrant Clause is
irrelevant, the probable cause requirement is to be liberally construed,
and that when some constitutional violations do occur, they will be ex-
cused.
Although excused violations under the good faith rule occur only
when a warrant has been obtained (reasonable reliance on a regularly
executed search warrant), the new "totality of the circumstances" test
for. determining probable cause operates as a kind of good faith mech-
anism in nonwarrant cases. The probable cause issue, which generally
revolves around information provided by informants, was formerly
controlled by the Aguilar-Spinelli-Draper two-prong test which required
a showing of: (1) the informant's reliability, and (2) his basis of
knowledge, i.e., how he came about his information. 128 Largely to
accommodate the anonymous informant, 29 and again in a decision
unnecessary to uphold the search, 130 a majority of the Court in Illi-
nois v. Gates abandoned the two-prong standard in favor of the more
fluid totality of the circumstances test.
Although Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion did not reject the
relevance of the veracity and the basis of knowledge of persons sup-
125. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
126. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 119-138.
128. In lieu of these requirements being particularly satisfied, probable cause could be
established by police corroboration of detail provided by an informant. Although prior to
Gates lower courts had held that corroboration could only satisfy the veracity prong and
detail could only satisfy the basis of knowledge prong of the two-prong test, this seems
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
129. The reliability of an anonymous informant is unknown and unknowable and his
basis of knowledge for the tip is seldom communicated. This was the situation in Gates v.
Illinois, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
130. Gates could have easily been decided under the corroboration of detail theory of
probable cause. See id at 267-74 (White, J., concurring).
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plying hearsay information, the amorphousness, flexibility, and breadth
of the new standard is revealed by the way Justice Rehnquist further
defined it. He described the probable cause question as "a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances .. .there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.""'
To be sure, Gates was a warrant case. Nothing in the majority
opinion, however, limits the new probable cause standard to cases
where warrants are issued.'32 There has never been an articulated
double standard for warrant and nonwarrant cases. 133 In fact, the
more fluid and flexible test for probable cause became largely super-
fluous to warrant cases following the adoption of the good faith excep-
tion to exclusion where officers obtain a search warrant.13 4 Now, in
those limited situations where probable cause is required, 135  police
131. I& at 238.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1990) (totality of
circumstances test set forth in Gates applied to measure probable cause in case of warrant-
less search of an automobile-application not limited to measuring probable cause to obtain
warrant); United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Reed, 733 F.2d 492, 502 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding there to be no binding authority for the
proposition that warrantless searches and arrests require a higher showing of probable cause
than do those conducted with warrants); United States v. Mendoza, 722 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.
1983) (sufficient probable cause was established under totality of circumstances standard to
justify warrantless search of automobile); (holding that probable cause justifying a warrant-
less search is identical with that required to justify issuance of a search warrant); State v.
Goyette, 594 A.2d 432 (Vt. 1991) (standard for sustaining the validity of a warrantless
search met where police had probable cause to search automobile where cocaine was found
under car seat); Hawkins v. State, 565 So. 2d 1193 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (authorizing the
warrantless search of a vehicle where the police initially have probable cause to believe that
the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime and if exigent circumstances ex-
ist-exigent circumstances said to exist whenever an object to be searched is mobile or
moveable, such as an automobile).
133. Draper v. United States was itself a nonwarrant case. Although the Supreme Court
has historically expressed a preference for search warrants, see United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102 (1965), speaking realistically and honestly, this is no longer the case.
134. It should be recognized, however, that a combination of the fluid totality standard
from Gates and the good faith notion from Leon virtually insulates a warrant based search
from constitutional attack based on a claim of lack of probable cause.
135. The most prevalent situations not requiring probable cause are the no privacy/no
search/no seizure cases. See supra text accompanying notes 14-86. Probable cause is also
unnecessary in the case of administrative and consent searches and in the case of a Terry
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officers will be constitutionally justified in acting without a warrant on
the basis of an informant's tip (or other information) if they have
made a practical, common-sense determination that there is a fair prob-
ability that contraband or evidence will be located in a particular
place.
The area where this should be most advantageous to law enforce-
ment is vehicular searches and the search of anything connected with
them. Practically since their invention, automobiles have been exempt-
ed from the demands of the Warrant Clause. The original justification
was based on the exigency of mobility, i.e., the delay involved might
result in the movement and loss of the vehicle. 136 Although the focus
has now changed to a diminished expectation of privacy,'37 the so-
called automobile exception to the warrant requirement is livelier than
ever.
Shortly after the Supreme Court adopted its privacy analysis, it
was confronted with the question of what expectation of privacy ap-
plied to containers, such as luggage, placed in automobiles. Although a
diminished privacy interest attached to vehicles, and they therefore
could be searched without a warrant, it had been consistently held that
repositories of. personal effects, e.g., luggage, purses, and backpacks,
enjoyed a complete or legitimate expectation of privacy. Consequently,
both probable cause and a warrant were required in order to search
these items, 38 and although originally this remained true even when
detention. Probable cause is now required only in the case of searches of privately owned
buildings, vehicles, and personal containers, and a warrant is generally required only in the
first of these cases. See California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
136. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
137. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The shift to the privacy theo-
ry was necessitated by the realization that in most cases the vehicle that was in police
control had been effectively immobilized. Nevertheless, it was easy for the Court to fit
automobiles into it's restrictive privacy formula-the expectation of privacy in an automobile
was viewed as diminished because automobiles travel around in public, you can see inside
them, and they are subject to regulation by the state. Therefore, since privacy is diminished,
only probable cause (and not a warrant) is necessary for an automobile search.
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the closed container was found in a vehicle,139 the warrant protection
quickly began to erode where an automobile was involved.
The first case to assimilate containers with the vehicle in which
they were found was a search-incident-to-arrest case."4 It did not
take the Court long, however, to apply the automobile exception
wholesale to all items found inside vehicles, including the trunk.Y
This conclusion was reached even though the justification for a war-
rantless search of an automobile-a diminished expectation of priva-
cy-did not apply to a closed container. Justice Stevens rationalized
this holding of United State v. Ross by analogizing to the authorized
search of fixed premises or a footlocker. His majority opinion noted
that the permissible scope of such searches extended into the entire
area where the object of the search might be found, including closets,
chests, drawers, and packages. He noted that what was absent in the
case of a vehicular search was the warrant requirement; the scope of
the probable cause search, he reasoned, remained the same. Conse-
quently, containers found in the vehicle were subject to the vehicular
search. What his opinion ignores, however-and it is crucial-is that a
warrant is generally required to search fixed premises and footlockers
in the first instance. These places are accorded fully protected privacy
interests. Any further openings following the initial entry are thus
protected by the warrant requirement initially. Why an item loses some
of its aura of privacy when placed in a vehicle is not entirely appar-
ent. It is, of course, more expedient to search without a warrant, and it
should come as no surprise that all of the Court's recent car search
cases involved drugs. 2
Irrespective of the Ross decision, the full expectation of privacy
and the greater protection of the warrant requirement continued to
apply to luggage and other such items which were the objects of po-
lice investigatory interest prior to being placed in an automobile. In
139. lit; see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
140. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Although Belton was argued and de-
cided as a search-incident-to-arrest case, the facts would have supported its consideration on
a probable cause to search the vehicle theory.
141. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
142. The permissible scope of the inventory procedure was also eventually applied to
suitcases and backpacks found in a vehicle. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
35
Ashdown: Drugs, Ideology, and the Deconstitutionalization of Criminal Proc
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1992
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
other words, luggage and other depositories of personal effects, which
police desired to search, did not sacrifice any privacy interest simply
by being placed in a vehicle.' 43 Where the focus of probable cause
was on the container, and not the automobile, a warrant was required
to search it.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court recently brought an end to
warrant protection for anything located in a vehicle, no matter what
the circumstances or when the item became the object of police atten-
tion. California v. Acevedo'" involved precisely the situation which
formerly would have required a search warrant; a brown paper bag
which police had reason to believe contained marijuana was placed in
the trunk of Acevedo's car. After he drove off, the police stopped him,
opened the trunk and the bag and found marijuana.
In its essence, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion states that
because the Court decided in Ross that containers found during an
automobile search could be examined without a warrant, no warrant
was necessary here as well. A bag, briefcase, or suitcase which police
believe to contain contraband and which is placed in a automobile is
"[no] more private, less difficult for police to seize and store, or in
any other relevant respect more properly subject to the warrant require-
ment, than a container that police discover in a probable-cause search
of an entire automobile."'45 This is disingenuity at its best, for it is
the argument made by the dissenters in Ross in favor of applying the
warrant requirement to containers found in vehicles under all circum-
stances. Specifically, the Ross dissenters had stated that the expectation
of privacy surrounding these items is entitled to respect regardless of
143. See smpra note 121.
144. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
145. kLa at 1988. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion also stated:
We now agree that a container found after a general search of the automobile and
a container found in a car after a limited search for the container are equally easy
for the police to store and for the suspect to hide or destroy. In fact, we see no
principled distinction in terms of either the privacy expectation or the exigent cir-
cumstances between the paper bag found by the police in Ross and the paper bag
found by the police here.
[Vol. 95:1
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whether they are found or placed in an automobile."4 Nevertheless,
the majority opinion in Acevedo concluded that because of the Ross
rule, there was no need to treat a container placed in a vehicle differ-
ently from one found there simply because the focus of probable cause
was on the container. Viewed from the perspective of the Ross dissent,
this can be translated as "bad law makes worse."
The Acevedo majority supported its position by arguing that the
Chadwick-Sanders rule provided only minimal protection for privacy
and might actually hinder privacy interests. Respecting the latter, the
majority opinion provided, "[i]f the police know that they may open a
bag only if they are actually searching the entire car, they may search
more extensively than they otherwise would in order to establish the
general probable cause required by Ross." 47 This statement, of
course, ignores the fact that such an extensive search would be illegal
if the police lacked probable cause to search the entire automobile, cir-
cumstances the Court admitted were lacking in the Acevedo case it-
self.148 To the extent that the conflict between Chadwick-Sanders and
Ross has created confusion, one would both hope and intuit that the
police would err on the side of legality, thus in most cases avoiding
the unjustified privacy intrusion mentioned by the Court.
Regarding confusion caused by the discrepancy between the two
rules, Justice Blackmun asked, "when an officer, who has developed
probable cause to believe a vehicle contains drugs, begins to search
the vehicle and immediately discovers a closed container, which rule
applies?" 149 But assuming probable cause to search the entire vehicle,
there should be no confusion here. Ross permits the search to pass
beyond the immediately discovered container-to the rest of the vehicle.
Actually, the Acevedo rule is more likely to create confusion than the
interplay between Chadwick and Ross. Justice Blackmun might well
have asked, "When an officer, who has developed probable cause to
search a closed container, discovers that the container has been placed
in a vehicle, which rule applies-Acevedo or Ross"?150 In other
146. 456 U.S. at 832.
147. 111 S. Ct. at 1988.
148. IL at 1991.
149. IM at 1989-90.
150. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion acknowledged that "[t]he facts in the record
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words, when a container which the police believe contains contraband
is placed in a vehicle, can only that container be searched or has
probable cause now been provided to search the entire vehicle?
The conclusion that the Chadwick-Sanders rule provided only
minimal protection to privacy is also unsatisfying. Justice Blackmun
stated that because the police "by hypothesis" have probable cause, the
container could be seized and a warrant would be "routinely forthcom-
ing" in any event. This statement ignores the precise function of a
search warrant-to have a judicial officer make the probable cause
determination prior to the invasion rather than the police. Moreover,
even if a warrant is "routinely forthcoming," the subsidiary (if not
primary) purpose served .by the warrant procedure is the establishment
of a record of probable cause prior to the search, rather than having it
based on the post hoc evaluation of the circumstances by the police
after the search proves fruitful. Justice Blackmun also suggested that
regardless of the Chadwick-Sanders rule, a container could often be
searched incident to a lawful arrest under New York v. Belton,5' a
search-incident-to-arrest case in which containers were assimilated with
the vehicle in which they were found. However, Blackmun's sugges-
tion assumes probable cause to arrest and ignores that a search inci-
dent to a vehicular arrest extends only to the interior of the automo-
bile. Both of these limitations would have been fatal to the application
of such a theory to the facts in Acevedo itself.
5 2
The real reason for the demise of the privacy protection provided
to briefcases, handbags, and luggage by the Chadwick-Sanders rule is
the final one given by the majority-the rule is anomalous, confusing,
reveal that the police did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in
any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been with-
out probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 111 S. Ct. at 1991. Al-
though this suggests that probable cause to search a container placed in a vehicle does not
supply probable cause to search the entire vehicle, one wonders why a reasonable officer
could not reach a contrary conclusion.
151. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
152. There would not have been probable cause to arrest Acevedo until it was deter-
mined that the bag which he placed in the automobile contained marijuana. He also had
placed the bag in the trunk of the automobile.
[Vol. 95:1
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and impedes effective law enforcement.1" This explanation and justi-
fication would have been more honestly stated if the Court had said
that anomaly and confusion are to decided in favor of law enforce-
ment. The elimination of the anomaly in Acevedo only created another
one. A briefcase suspected of containing contraband is protected on the
street by the warrant requirement, but once it is placed in a vehicle,
that protection is no longer available. It will come as no surprise if
this particular anomaly is also soon eliminated.154
The most breathtaking aspect of Acevedo is the way Justice
Blackmun concludes the majority opinion. He states:
It remains a "cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside the judi-
cial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few spe-
cifically established and well-delineated exceptions. " '
This statement is now preposterous. Justice Scalia recognized as much
in his concurring opinion. 5 ' It would, have been more honest and
accurate for Justice Blackmun to have said, "It [no longer] remains a
cardinal principle that ... ." Practically speaking, a warrant is cur-
rently required only for the search of a privately owned building.157
Additionally, probable cause (but not a warrant) is necessary only
where a vehicle or any closed container inside the vehicle is searched.
In most other cases, the police can investigate and inspect without
probable cause and, in many cases, no measure of suspicion or justifi-
cation for the intrusion need be provided.
153. 111 S. Ct. at 1991.
154. Elimination of this anomaly was, in fact, the basis of Justice Scalia's concurrence.
His view was that a closed container (e.g., a briefcase, handbag, or a suitcase), located out-
side a privately owned building, was simply not subject to the warrant requirement. ld. at
1994 (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 1991 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))).
156. ld. at 1992-93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. Although theoretically the warrant requirement might still apply to a briefcase,
luggage, or handbag, etc., practically speaking, law enforcement officers will seldom need a
warrant to search these items. They are either likely to be found in a vehicle or searched
incident to arrest. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Acevedo plainly advocated applica-
tion of the Warrant Clause only to privately owned buildings. Il at 1992-94.
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E. Reliability of Outcome Versus Deterrence
The Supreme Court's treatment of the Fourth Amendment is con-
sistent with its predominant theme respecting the crimpinal process. The
Court has been rather satisfied with convictions as long as they are
factually reliable regardless of constitutional error. 58 This philosophy
is revealed by the Court's treatment of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, 159 a prosecutor's failure to provide the defense with potentially
exculpatory material, 6° errors occurring before the grand jury,'6 '
misjoinder problems, 62 and, most recently, coerced confessions. 63
Regardless of these errors, a majority of the Court has been willing to
let convictions stand if the defendant could nevertheless be viewed as
guilty. Although a variety of devices and standards have been utilized
(no prejudice, no reasonable likelihood of an effect on the outcome,
and harmless error analysis), the result is exactly the same-a guilty
verdict can stand irrespective of errors, constitutional or otherwise, in
the way in which it was obtained.
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is consis-
tent with its policy of preserving convictions which are in some sense
thought to be reliable. Restricting the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection limits the operation of the exclusionary rule and consequent-
ly avoids the exclusion of generally reliable' 64 physical evidence.
158. This theme has been well documented by the commentators. See Charles
Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure: The Recent
Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 471 (1985);
Charles Whitebread & John Heilman, The Interpretation of Constitutional Rights-Reflections
on the Burger Court's Counterrevolution in Criminal Procedure, 1986 DET. COL. L.R. 935;
Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1369 (1991).
159. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
160. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
161. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988); United States v.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
162. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986).
163. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); see Charles Ogletree, Arizona v.
Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 152 (1991).
164. Although the Supreme Court consistently speaks of evidence seized in violation of
[Vol. 95:1
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Nevertheless, there is conflict here with another of the Court's histori-
cal themes in the criminal procedure arena-the deterrence of illegal
police behavior.
The predominant policy, and more recently the exclusive policy,
which has driven the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of police
illegality. It is surely apparent to even the casual observer that the
Supreme Court has been drastically more lenient with the police over
the last decade and has allowed law enforcement substantially more
room to maneuver in the investigatory process. The Court is now
sending a clear, overall nondeterrent message to the police. The atti-
tude and concomitant atmosphere is not now one of deterrence and
scrutiny of search and seizure practices, but instead one of general
permissiveness. The teaching of the Supreme Court is now that all is
fair in, among other things, crime detection.
The argument that there is little incremental deterrent effect in
requiring federal courts to review individual Fourth Amendment claims,
after they have been passed upon by state courts, is plausible.
16 5
Similarly, there may be little deterrent effect in applying the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, 166 civil tax enforcement
cases, 67 deportation cases,161 or to cases in which officers have re-
lied in good faith on a regularly executed search warrant.169 Howev-
er, when these conclusions are viewed along with the other decisions
that restrict Fourth Amendment protection by concluding that there is
no expectation of privacy, no search, or no seizure, the overall harm to
the deterrent impact of Fourth Amendment law on police behavior is
clear. Dissenting from the majority's adoption of the "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule, recently retired Justice Brennan
noted:
the Fourth Amendment as being reliable, this is not so where the evidence or contraband is
erroneously associated with the defendant.
165. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
166. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
167. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
168. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
169. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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To be sure, the rule operates to some extent to deter future conduct
by individual officers who have had evidence suppressed in their own
cases. But what the Court overlooks is that the deterrent rationale for the
rule is not designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a form of "pun-
ishment" of individual officers for their failure to obey the restraints im-
posed by the Fourth Amendment .... Instead, the chief deterrent function
of the rule is its tendency to promote institutional compliance with Fourth
Amendment requirements on the part of law enforcement agencies general-
ly. Thus, as the Court has previously recognized, "over the long term,
[the] demonstration [provided by the exclusionary rule] that our society
attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the offi-
cers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into
their value system." . . . It is only through such an institutional mechanism
that information concerning Fourth Amendment standards can be effective-
ly communicated to rank-and-file officers.17
As the Supreme Court repeatedly limits the exclusionary rule and
restricts the substantive scope of Fourth Amendment protection, what-
ever institutional mechanism the Fourth Amendment formerly served as
a control on police investigatory practices is lost. The institutional
message now being received by law enforcement personnel from the
United States Supreme Court is that the Fourth Amendment is not
much of an obstacle to their work and that the theory of deterrence
only applies to cases of punishing criminals and nuclear weapons.
Ironically, criminal defendants are getting much more protection
from state courts around the country who are utilizing their own state
constitutions to place limits on police investigatory practices beyond
that which the United States Supreme Court is willing to provide un-
der the United States Constitution.17' Unfortunately, the rights guar-
anteed to the citizens of the various states are not uniform-the con-
trols placed on law enforcement are not the same in New York as
they are in Ohio-but the restrictions on police behavior are greater
than they are under the federal constitution and concomitantly greater
than those that apply to federal officers. 7 ' The double irony in this
170. Id at 897, 953-54 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., People v. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Cavanaugh, 545
N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio 1988).
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is that the incorporation process-the application of the Bill of Rights
to the states through the due process provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment-was designed to bring the states into compliance with
more rigorous federal standards and to make .the criminal process uni-
form. Now, the generally better trained federal agents are granted more
freedom than their state counterparts ' and interestingly, this comes
at a time when both substantive federal criminal law and its enforce-
ment are expanding. Just to mention the irony in all this once more,
this is the situation that the anti-federalists most feared at the time the
Constitution was adopted and, of course, it was this concern that led
to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
III. THE SURVivOR-INTRROGATION AND CoNFESsIoNs
A. Toying with Miranda
Although during the past twenty years the shifting majority of the
Supreme Court has tugged at the seams of the landmark, Miranda174
decision, the Court has shown no inclination to completely unravel it.
In fact, to the contrary, any weakened threads of Miranda have been
covered by even livelier Sixth Amendment fabric.
The Miranda holding, requiring that various warnings be given to
a suspect prior to custodial interrogation, was based on the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at a time when the
Court was poised to require, under the Sixth Amendment, the presence
of counsel at all custodial interrogation sessions. In Massiah v. United
173. This phenomenon is similar to the fear consistently expressed by Justice Harlan
with respect to the incorporation doctrine. He argued that forcing federal rules on the states
would eventually lead to dilution of federal rights as the Court made an effort to accommo-
date the varying and different interests of the states in criminal law enforcement. See Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129-38 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
The two things that Justice Harlan did not foresee, however, were, one, that the
Court would directly dilute federal rights, not necessarily to accommodate state interests, but
in the name of the war on drugs, and two, that the states would respond by providing
more protection to criminal defendants under their own constitutions. Consequently, and
ironically, we now have the dual federal and state system that Justice Harlan favored, but,
contrary to the Harlan view, with the states offering more extensive safeguards.
174. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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States17 and especially in Escobedo v. Illinois,176 the Supreme
Court had held that the Sixth Amendment was violated when the po-
lice interrogated the defendants in the absence of their lawyers. Al-
though Massiah had been indicted and Escobedo had asked for and
been denied the opportunity to speak with his attorney (and the hold-
ings could be limited in these ways), the Court appeared to be on the
verge of applying the right to counsel to all interrogation sessions.
Miranda v. Arizona actually diverted the court to a new constitutional
path based on the Fifth Amendment rather than the Sixth. Instead of
requiring counsel's presence during custodial interrogation, a rule
which had the potential to drastically reduce, if not eliminate, out-of-
court statements, the Court held that criminal suspects must be warned
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the right
to speak with a lawyer, and the right to have a lawyer present during
interrogation; the latter right to have counsel present during interroga-
tion designed to protect the former right to silence.
Thus, rather than demanding the presence of an attorney at post-
arrest interrogation, the Court required certain warnings regarding the
Fifth Amendment privilege not to talk. These rights, Chief Justice
Warren noted, could be (and often have been) waived.17 7 The Court
chose to level the playing field in favor of criminal defendants through
obligatory warnings about constitutional rights, reducing the coercive
environment of police interrogation in this way, rather than by requir-
ing counsel's presence in the interrogation room. This latter right, if
recognized, would have proven a much more difficult (and obstructive)
thing to waive. Viewed from this perspective, Miranda v. Arizona was
never the ultimately liberal Warren Court decision that it might have
been, and for which it was given credit. This may be one reason why
the present Supreme Court, with a different ideological bent, continues
to honor it.
To be sure, Miranda has been undercut in some ways, at least
two of which are significant. First, the impeachment decisions provide
ruthless interrogators with an incentive to violate Miranda. Although
175. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
176. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
177. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
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New York v. Harris,178 holding that out-of-court statements given in
the absence of complete warnings could be used to impeach the defen-
dant if he testifies, is not surprising or profound, the follow-up case of
Oregon v. Hass179 is relative dynamite. In Hass, after complete warn-
ings had been given, Hass asserted his right to counsel. The question-
ing officers nevertheless persisted and eventually obtained incriminating
statements. As in Harris, the Court held that although the statements
could not be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief, they could be
used for impeachment purposes when and if the defendant testified.
The Court then went one step further in United States v.
Havens.8 ' Although in his direct testimony Havens had avoided any
reference to the illegally seized evidence, a 5-4 majority, per Justice
White, permitted the prosecution on cross-examination to ask him
questiotis about and then impeach him with the previously inadmissible
evidence as long as the questions on cross-examination were "reason-
ably suggested by the defendant's direct examination." 8' Havens in-
volved a Fourth Amendment violation; however, the theory and hold-
ing would apply equally well in the Fifth Amendment context. If a
defendant, who has made inadmissible statements taken in violation of
Miranda, opts to testify and attempts to avoid impeachment by staying
clear of the area encompassed by his out-of-court remarks, he can
nevertheless be questioned about these statements on cross-examination
and impeached with them if the questions were "reasonably suggested"
by his testimony on direct. It is, in fact, difficult to imagine a case in
which the defendant's direct testimony would not reasonably suggest
earlier, out-of-court incriminating statements.1
8 2
178. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
179. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
180. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
181. Id. at 627-28. This sounds like a lenient version of the rule limiting cross-exami-
nation to the scope of the direct. See FED. R. EVD. 611(b). In Havens, the defendant de-
nied being involved with his codefendant in the transportation of cocaine. On cross-examina-
tion, he denied involvement in sewing a pocket in which drugs were found into his
codefendant's clothing or having in his suitcase the fabric from which the pocket was cut.
The Supreme Court permitted impeachment of his testimony by admission of the cloth ille-
gally seized from his suitcase.
182. For example, in James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990), James was located at his
mother's beauty parlor sitting under a hair dryer, his hair was black and curly. When ques-
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Although understandably based on a policy of preventing perjury,
the Harris-Hass-Havens trilogy offers aggressive officers a tool to
circumvent Miranda entirely. If a suspect asserts his rights, the police
have nothing to lose and perhaps something to gain if they continue to
question him. If he ultimately relents in the face of persistent police
pressure, he simply cannot testify in his own behalf. If he does, he
will surely be impeached by his otherwise inadmissible out-of-court
statements. And, of course, if the defendant does not (because he
cannot) testify, his fate is generally sealed.
The other decisions imposing notable limitations on the effective-
ness of Miranda relate to the manner in which the warnings must be
given. In recent years, the Court has been quite lenient with the police
regarding the information which must be conveyed to the .suspect.
Only the essence of the Miranda requireinents have been deemed nec-
essary; thorough compliance has not been demanded. The most signifi-
cant thing about these cases is that they seem to dispense with the
heart of the Miranda opinion-effectively warning the arrestee regard-
ing the right to talk with an appointed attorney prior to custodial inter-
rogation and the right to have the attorney present during question-
ing.8 3  In California v. Prysock,18 4  the Court upheld warnings
which conveyed only the general right to a lawyer sometime, without
tioned about his prior hair color, James told the police that it had been reddish-brown, long,
and combed straight back, and that he had his hair dyed and curled to change his appear-
ance. Because James had been illegally arrested, these statements were suppressed. At the
trial, five witnesses testified that the killer had long, reddish hair, worn in a slicked-back
style, and that James had earlier had this hair color and style.
Assuming that James testified at his trial that he was not involved in the murder
and that he had an alibi, under Havens, the prosecutor would surely have been able to
impeach him with his previously inadmissable statements about his changed appearance. (In
James, a witness actually testified that James' hair was black and curly on the date of the
shooting. He was then impeached with James' earlier statements. The Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction, refusing to extend Harris to defense witnesses.) See also 'Albert W.
Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436,
1442-43 (1987).
183. Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The warnings regarding the right to counsel were designed to protect this right, and were
not independent Sixth Amendment rights in themselves.
184. 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
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even indirectly suggesting that the right attached immediately, prior to
and during custodial interrogation. 8 5 More importantly, in Duckworth
v. Eagan,186 a majority of the Justices upheld warnings in which
Eagan was told that his right to a lawyer matured only later at a judi-
cial proceeding, rather than prior to police interrogation. 8 7 In both
Prysock and Eagan, the Court said that only the general thrust of
Miranda must be complied with and that technical adherence to the
various warnings was not necessary to inform the suspect of his rights.
These cases, I think, are meaningful. They tell interrogating offi-
cers that they -need not exercise care while informing the suspect that
he has a right to a lawyer free-of-charge before he can be questioned,
and indeed, this can be circumvented entirely if the other warnings are
essentially adequate. To the extent that Miranda protects suspects from
sealing their own fate, it is likely the immediate availability of a law-
yer, rather than an announced right to silence, that suggests to the
suspect that he has a legal ally and deters out-of-court statements to
the police. To the extent that Prysock and Eagan are utilized, either
intentionally or inadvertently, the effectiveness of Miranda as an insu-
lator is undercut.
Other decisions have limited (or refused to expand) Miranda,
albeit not as significantly as the impeachment cases or Prysock-Eagan.
For example, New York v. Quarles8. not surprisingly established the
notion that police do not have to give the warnings during the heat of
battle. Quarles established the so-called "public safety" exception to
Miranda, avoiding the necessity of giving the warnings when the situa-
tion has not been diffused and some immediate threat to the public
might still exist. Additionally, both Moran v. Burbine8 9 and Colo-
rado v. Spring'9° simply refused to expand Miranda. In Burbine, the
Court refused to require the police to tell Burbine that an attorney was
185. kd at 361.
186. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
187. IL at 204.
188. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
189. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
190. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
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trying to contact him and intervene in his behalf during the interroga-
tion. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion concluded that the Miranda
warnings struck the appropriate balance (leveled the playing field) and
that more was not necessary. Similarly in Spring, the Court concluded
that warning the defendant of the particular offense under investigation
was not a required part of the warnings. Although both pieces of in-
formation might have been helpful to the defendants in these cases-in
terms of a knowing waiver-both would have actually expanded the
Miranda requirements. As such, even though these decisions might be
viewed with disfavor by liberal advocates of individual rights, they are
hardly serious limitations on Miranda itself.
Although the custody requirement of Miranda has largely been
equated with arrest, 9' the Supreme Court has provided an expansive
definition of interrogation. Miranda could be viewed as prohibiting
only express interrogation in the absence of the warnings; however, the
Court in Rhode Island v. Innis92 made it clear that the definition of
interrogation was not so limited. Justice Stewart's majority opinion
defined interrogation as including "any words or actions on the part of
the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 93 Even though
this decision was not liberally applied in Innis itself,194 it clearly
goes beyond direct questioning to ploys which are designed (or are
reasonably likely) to bring a response. Such ploys include confronting
the suspect with an accomplice's confession (fictitious or otherwise),
the weapons used in the offense, or the fruits of a burglary or robbery.
Certainly many of the techniques described in the interrogation manu-
als would be covered by the Innis definition.
191. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492 (1977); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Minnesota v. Murphy,
465 U.S. 420 (1984).
192. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
193. Id at 300.
194. There were three officers in the cruiser with the arrestee Innis. Although the exact
seating arrangement was somewhat unclear, one of the officers, using words like "Gee" and
"God forbid," worryied out loud about the fact that a school for handicapped children was
nearby the murder scene and how awful it would be if one of the handicapped children
found the weapon and hurt herself with it. lad at 294-95.
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More significantly, in Edwards v. Arizona,95 the Court expanded
the Miranda requirement by holding that once a defendant requests an
attorney, he cannot be questioned further until he has been provided
with a lawyer unless the defendant himself reinitiates contact with the
police. Most important, in the last few years, the Court, in the face of
its new ideological philosophy toward the criminal process, has ex-
panded the Edwards rule. In the 1988 decision of Arizona v.
Roberson,% a 6-2 majority held that Edwards also bars questioning
about crimes and investigations separate from the one for which the
defendant had originally requested counsel.' 97 In 1990, the Court in
Minnick v. Mississippi98 held in a 6-2 majority opinion written by
Justice Kennedy that the Edwards and Roberson requirements were not
satisfied by merely providing the defendant with the opportunity to
speak with an attorney (Minnick had spoken with an appointed attor-
ney on "two or three occasions"). The Court held that Edwards means
that the defendant has the right to have counsel present during any
police-initiated interrogation (Mimnnick had been approached and ques-
tioned by a deputy sheriff without his lawyer present). The Edwards-
Roberson-Minnick cases thus represent a continuing inclination on the
part of the Court to protect criminal defendants in the interrogation
process.
Consequently, during the past fifteen years or so, although the
Supreme Court has flirted with undermining Miranda, it has by-and-
large backed off and has even expanded the decision's effectiveness.
Perhaps the clearest indication of the Court's continuing attitude to-
ward interrogation and confessions is the fact that the Justices have
been willing to go beyond Miranda and the Fifth Amendment in pro-
viding criminal defendants with protection from the extraction and use
of incriminating statements.
195. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
196. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
197. Justice Steven's majority opinion reasoned that when an arrestee requests a lawyer
in response to the warnings, he is expressing his belief that he needs an attorney to assist
him during the interrogation process generally, and not just for the particular crime for
which he has been arrested. See id
198. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
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B. Revival of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
As indicated earlier, before the Supreme Court decided Miranda v.
Arizona, they had been focusing on the Sixth Amendment.'" After
Massiah and Escobedo, the Court was poised to require the presence
of an attorney during all interrogation sessions unless the defendant
knowingly and intelligently refused the presence of counsel. Miranda
switched the Court to the less drastic and demanding Fifth Amendment
track.
In 1978, during Chief Justice Burger's tenure, the Supreme Court,
now a much more conservative body, revived Massiah in a rather
horrible murder case. In the somewhat notorious case (at least in crim-
inal procedure circles) of Brewer v. Williams,0" the Court held that
an Iowa detective violated the Sixth Amendment when he utilized the
infamous "Christian burial speech" to get Williams to show him the
location of ten-year-old Pamela Powers, whom he had kidnapped and
murdered. Although the Sixth Amendment foundation of Williams was
clear, the parameters of the decision were not as obvious.
Williams could have been decided as a Fifth Amendment case
under Miranda. Justice Stewart's opinion described Detective
Leaming's "Christian burial" talk as interrogation"' and Williams
was clearly in custody. Nevertheless, something motivated the Court to
rest the decision on the Sixth Amendment. It could have been because
Williams already had spoken with a lawyer (actially two lawyers) or
because the police had made an agreement with Williams' lawyer not
to question Williams. The Court may also have based its decision on
the Sixth Amendment because Williams had appeared before a magis-
trate or because the Court felt that waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel would be more difficult than waiver of Fifth Amend-
ment rights.2'
199. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
200. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
201. Id. at 400.
202. The Court has recently rejected a more demanding standard for waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right in the interrogation context. In Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285
(1988), the Court held that the giving of the warnings required by Miranda were sufficient
[Vol. 95:1
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Irrespective of this collage of facts, later cases make it clear that
Williams was not fact dependent. In a number of post-Williams deci-
sions, the Court has indicated that the crucial fact in Williams was that
adversary judicial proceedings had begun.2 "3 At this point, the ad-
versarial positions of the parties solidify and the government must deal
with the defendant through his lawyer.
The point at which adversarial proceedings commence is the initial
appearance before the magistrate.2°4 The significance of the Court's
recent Sixth Amendment decisions is that, after this stage in the pro-
cess, the government is prohibited from deliberately eliciting informa-
tion from the defendant in the absence of his lawyer. Unlike the situa-
tion in Miranda, custody and interrogation are not necessary because
once formal criminal proceedings have begun, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel will be violated when the government utilizes an in-
formant, undercover agent, or codefendant to prompt the defendant into
making extra-judicial statements."
This foray back into Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in the inter-
rogation context reveals the Supreme Court's continuing commitment
to leveling the self-incrimination playing field in favor of criminal
defendants. Although the decisions involving out-of-court statements
for both Fifth and Sixth Amendment waivers.
203. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
204. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
205. The decision in Kuhlmann somewhat clouds the meaning of deliberate elicitation.
The police placed Wilson in a cell overlooking the scene of the robbery and murder for
which he had been charged.oAn informant was also present in the cell, and although the
police had told the informant, Benny Lee, not to question Kuhlmann about the crime, when
Kuhlmann told Lee the same story that he had told the police, Lee responded by advising
Wilson that his story "didn't sound to good" and that "things didn't look to good for him."
Wilson later changed his story and admitted to Lee his involvement in the crimes. Never-
theless, the majority in Kuhlmann characterized Lee as a passive listener, and concluded that
he had not deliberately elicited information from Kuhlmann.
This conclusion appears inconsistent with United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980), where an informant cellmate was also told not to question Henry about the crime,
and there had been no showing that he had. Here the majority concluded that the informant
was not just a listener, that he had some conversations with Henry, and that Henry's in-
criminating statements were the product of those conversations.
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are clearly not one-sided, they display a markedly different attitude
than the carte-blanche-to-the-police philosophy evident in Fourth
Amendment cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Anyone who has studied the United States Supreme Court's crimi-
nal procedure decisions over the past fifteen years or so is left with
the impression that the Court is in the process of removing the federal
Constitution from predominant influence in the criminal process. Not
only is this most evident in the Fourth Amendment area, but also these
search and seizure cases may provide the explanation for such a trend.
No one would deny that the Court has been gravitating toward being
generally much more conservative. However, the Court's reactivism
and retrenchment in the criminal arena has been fueled, if not driven,
by the war on drugs. Virtually all of the Court's relatively contempo-
rary Fourth Amendment decisions are drug cases, and in virtually all
of them, a majority of the Court has decided in favor of the prosecu-
tion in order to avoid the suppression of the corpus of the offense.
The result has been a drastic restriction in the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment protection generally. Of course, this restriction applies to all
criminal investigations, not just those involving narcotics. Although the
Court has shown no inclination (as of yet) to overrule Mapp v.
Ohio,2°0 effectively the same result has been accomplished. The
Court has circumvented the exclusionary rule by limiting the situations
in which it applies by narrowing Fourth Amendment protection. These
Court decisions have been aimed at ensuring the admissibility of nar-
cotics taken from a defendant, thus guaranteeing a conviction.
Even in the interrogation and confessions arena, the one area in
which the Court has continued to show some sensitivity to the interests
of criminal defendants, arguably reveals its anti-drug agenda. At least
two explanations for the continuing scrutiny of the interrogation area,
although possibly somewhat cynical, are consistent with the anti-drug
206. Regardless of the Court's drug enforcement philosophy, overruling Mapp would
clearly send the wrong message to law enforcement. Exclusion of evidence has been avoid-
ed in any event through restriction of the Fourth Amendment.
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policy. First, persons in possession of contraband or evidence of crime
naturally tend to hide and secret that which could land them in jail.
This realization has lead to a judicial philosophy granting law enforce-
ment more freedom to detect that which is not readily exposed; there
is essentially a judicial imprimatur on search and seizure practices. On
the other hand, in the interrogation and confession context, criminal
defendants have a tendency to talk; they reveal what they know and
incriminate themselves. The studies of the effects of the Miranda deci-
sion on the incidents of incriminating out-of-court statements bear this
out.207 Consequently, a pro-law enforcement judicial, philosophy can
nevertheless afford to provide defendants with some constitutional
protection in the interrogation arena. Not much is lost.
A second explanation for the disparity in judicial treatment be-
tween search and seizure, on the one hand, and interrogation and con-
fessions, on the other, is that self-incrimination is not all that valuable
a tool in the war on drugs. The case against most drug defendants is
made by the search for and seizure of the contraband. An admission
that the narcotics belong to the arrestee, although helpful, is often
largely superfluous. 2°' Again, with drug prosecutions driving judicial
policy, the Court can afford to retain some constitutional supervision
over the interrogation process.
207. See, e.g., Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE
L.J. 1519 (1967) ("Miranda warnings had little impact on suspect's behavior"; "in almost
every case" police had adequate evidence to convict without interrogation"); Richard Medalie
et al., Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968) (rate of statements given to police "remarkably uniform" before
and after Miranda"); Lawrence Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado, 47 DENVER L.J. 1
(1970); David Neubauer, Confessions in Prairie City, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINoLOGY 103
(1974); Cyril D. Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating to Inter-
rogation as Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires, 1968 DUKE L.J 425; James
Witt, Non Coercive Interrogation and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 64 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973). But see Richard Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Miranda in
Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PrT. L. REV. 1 (1967) (confessions did drop signifi-
cantly after Miranda, but clearance and conviction rates remained virtually unchanged).
208. This is not to say, however, that interrogation of drug offenders is never useful.
Questioning of drug arrestees may be helpful, for instance, in revealing the involvement of
others in drug organizations or conspiracies.
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Of course, the Court's reaction to publicity about the drug prob-
lem cannot explain everything. There are other crimes to investigate
and solve. 'When physical evidence is seized from a suspect, only his
external sphere of privacy is invaded."°9 Extracting incriminating
statements from the mind and mouth of an arrestee, however, involves
a greater personal intrusion, and is generally conclusive. Other consti-
tutional guarantees, such as the right to a trial, become essentially
meaningless. Ruthless tactics in this latter realm thus appear over-
reaching. The Supreme Court's permissive attitude toward law en-
forcement generally (and search and seizure practices in particular), but
continued supervision of the interrogation process, can possibly be
explained by the adage "play hard, but fair."
Regardless, much of the Supreme Court's recent criminal proce-
dure jurisprudence is unfortunate. To the extent that it is driven by a
perceived or real drug problem in this country, someday the war on
drugs will be over-won or lost-leaving us with a draconian lack of
constitutional insulation from criminal investigation and prosecution
with respect to other crimes. The reaction of the state courts has been
helpful but uneven, resulting in a practical patchwork of procedural
protection depending entirely on jurisdictional proclivities. It is possible
that now is the time for the states to seriously consider the adoption of
a uniform code of criminal procedure, such as the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure, to restore some kind of balance and uniformity
to criminal processes. However, given philosophical and political dis-
agreement over the balance between individual rights and law enforce-
ment, optimism over such an initiative hardly seems warranted.
209. And this is realistically true regardless of Supreme Court conclusions that there is
no "constitutionally legitimate expectation of privacy."
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